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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JAMES FRANCIS DENIER,

:

Case No. 20081057-CA

:

Appellant is not incarcerated

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-103
(2009). Appellant, James Denier, was convicted of violation of a protective order, a class
A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (2008). The judgment is attached as
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing the City to present evidence at

trial in violation of the hearsay rules.
Standard of Review: "The question of whether evidence is admissible can be
either a question of discretion, which we review for abuse of discretion, or a
question oflaw, which we review for correctness.5' State v. Martin, 2002 UT
34, «|129, 44P.3d 805.
II.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling Denier could not discuss the terms

of the visitation order between Samuel and himself.

Standard of Review: "[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
proffered evidence is relevant, and the |appellate court] will find error in a relevancy
ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State vs. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
III.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the City presented

sufficient evidence to establish a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108.
Standard of Review: The Court "rcviewfs] the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury."
State v. Pctree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous cases). The verdict of
the jury will be reversed for insufficient evidence when the "evidence . . . is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id.
However, notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision, this Court has
the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Specifically:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between the
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to review the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it
will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^ 15, 63 P.3d 94 (citing Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
The first issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 105:3738,69,70. The
second issue was preserved in the record at 105:102,103. The third issue was preserved
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in the record at 105:86.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to the issues here: Utah R. Evid. 801, 802,
and 803; Utah R. Evid. 16; Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108; and Utah R. of Crim. 17(p).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
On January 17, 2008, Salt Lake City charged James Denier ("Denier") with one
count of violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor under Utah State Code §
76-5-108. (R. 1.)
On October 1, 2008, the jury trial began. (R. 105:2.) Salt Lake City called two
witnesses, Catherine Samuel ("Samuel") and Officer Degraw ("Degraw"). (R. 105:48,
67.) Denier testified on his own behalf. (R. 105:95.) The jury trial lasted one day. (R.
105:138-140.) The jury began deliberations and reached a verdict that same day. (R.
105:137-140.) The jury returned a guilty verdict. (R. 105:138.)
On November 25, 2008, the trial court sentenced Denier to 365 days in jail. (R.
90.) The trial court suspended all but four days jail. (R. 90.) On December 23, 2008
Denier filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R. 103.) Denier is not incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Salt Lake City Presented the Following Evidence at Trial According to the City's
evidence, Catherine Samuel had known Denier for more than fourteen years. (R.
105:53.) Samuel had a protective order against Denier. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1,
Protective Order, cittached as Addendum 13; (R. 105:55.) The protective order had been
3

in place for ten years and prohibited Denier from contacting Samuel except regarding
visitation of their son, Connor. (R. 105:55,56.)
On December 30, 2007, at approximately five o' clock, Samuel called Denier. (R.
105:49.) She had been out of town with their son and Denier called several of her
acquaintances asking if they knew where Connor was. (R. 105:49.) Samuel called
Denier and told him to please not call any of her Iriends. (R. 105:49.) The conversation
lasted a few minutes. (R. 105:51.)
According to Samuel, during the conversation. Denier swore and yelled. (R.
105:50.) After the first conversation, Samuel called Denier again to advise him that it
was not o.k. for Denier to swear and yell over the phone. (R. 105:51.) Further, if he
swore or yelled, Samuel would consider that harassment. (R. 105:51.)
Shortly alter the second conversation, approximately five twenty, Denier called
Samuel. (R. 105:51.) She did not answer the phone. (R. 105:51.) Denier left a message
on her voicemail. (R. 105:51.) She did not answer the phone because she thought Denier
was angry and he would leave a message. (R. 105:52.) Samuel recalled that on the
message Denier stated he knew the phone call was being recorded. (R. 105:53.)
Specifically, Samuel recalled that Denier said:
Go ahead and take me to court, like you have three or four times in the past eight
or nine years. Go ahead and make a spectacle of yourself because I've always
been found innocent. You don't have a protective order, you never have. It
doesn't hold any weight in court because I've always been found innocent. (R.
105:54.)
One line that stood out to Samuel was that Denier stated the protective order
"doesn't hold a teardrop worth of water." (R. 105:54.) Samuel testified the message left
4

by Denier did not relate to visitation of their son and therefore violated the protective
order. (R. 105:56.)
On cross examination, Samuel said she had been in Colorado prior to December
30, 2008 with their son, Connor. (R. 105: 57.) Further, she documents everything and
although she did not have the recorded message she had a ''written recollection" of the
incident and the police report. (R. 105:59.)
During the trial, the defense attempted to introduce evidence that Samuel had been
held in contempt of court to impeach her testimony. (R. 105:61.) The trial court ruled
that the evidence was irrelevant to the current trial. (R. 105:63.)
After Samuel, the City called Officer Degraw to testify. (R. 105:67.) Officer
Degraw responded to the incident. (R. 105:68.) Prior to this incident, Degraw had never
met Denier nor heard his voice. (R. 105:75.)
Samuel told Degraw that Denier contacted her by phone and also attempted to find
her through friends. (R. 105:68.) Further, she saved a message that Denier left on her
voicemail. (R. 105:69.) Degraw listened to the message. (R. 105:69.) The caller never
identified himself. (R. 105:75.)
Defense counsel objected to Degraw's testimony relating the content of the
message for lack of foundation and hearsay. (R. 105:69, 70.) The trial court held that
Degraw could testily about the content of the message but not who left the message. (R.
105:69.) Degraw testified the caller said:
Me knew the conversation was being recorded. 1 Ic [the caller) was talking about
the complaints that had been filed over the last eight or nine years, and that they'd
all been found false or, his words were that they were found innocent, not guilty.
5

He [the caller] was talking, he did talk about "this is about our son, not about you,
not about me.'
At that time, Dcgraw thought the incident did not violate the protective order
because they called back and forth and the protective order allowed contact to arrange
visitation with their child. (R. 105:76.) Dcgraw never spoke to Denier regarding the
message. (R. 105:77.)
Denier Testified in His Defense.
Denier could sec his son every Wednesday and every other weekend. (R. 105:
96.) During the holidays there was not a precise custody arrangement. (R. 105:96).
However, he regularly saw his son. (R. 105:97.) When he didn't have custody, Denier
would talk to his son several times a month. (R. 105:97.) His son had a cell phone that
Denier would call. (R. 105:97.)
Prior to December 30th, Denier called his son several times but there was no
answer. (R. 105:97.) Denier called his son's cell phone and home phone. (R. 105:98.)
He tried to contact his son approximately six or seven times. (R. 105:98.) After trying to
contact his son several times, Denier became anxious and concerned. (R. 105: 98.) He
called his son's friend and spoke to the friend's father. (R. 105:98.) Denier learned his
son and Samuel were in Colorado for Christmas. (R. 105: 99.) Once he learned his son
had been in Colorado, he was relieved that his son was o.k. (R. 105:99.)
The next contact Denier had was when Samuel called him. (R. 105:100.) Denier
recalled that Samuel called on December 30th and was upset that Denier called Connor's
friend and spoke with the friend's father. (R. 105: 99.) Denier could not remember if he
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called Samuel on the day in question. (R. 105:101.) However. Denier had left messages
before on Samuel's voicemail. (R. 105:102.) Denier was never questioned by law
enforcement about the incident. (R. 105:101.)
During the trial, defense counsel asked Denier if Samuel ever called him and
asked Denier to dinner. (R. 105:102.) The City objected and the trial court sustained the
objected arguing the information was not relevant. (R. 105:102.) Defense counsel also
asked Denier about the visitation order between Samuel and Denier. (R. 105:102.) The
City objected and again argued the information was not relevant. (R. 105:102.) The
defense argued the information was relevant in that it went to the credibility of the City's
witness, Samuel. (R. 105:103.) Also, the protective order allowed for contact if it related
to their son. (R. 105:103.) If Samuel took their son to Colorado in violation of the
parties visitation agreement, it would make it more likely any contact by Denier was
related to the visitation of their son and therefore was not a violation of the protective
order. (R. 105:103.)
At the conclusion of trial, the jury deliberated for approximately two hours and
later that night returned a verdict of guilty. (R. 105:138.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it allowed Officer Degraw to testify about a message
left on Catherine Samuel's recorded message. The trial court permitted Degraw to testify
as to the content of the voicemail. 1 lowever. the trial court ruled Degraw could not
testify as to who left the recorded message. The caller never identified himself and
Degraw had not previously spoken to Denier.
7

Allowing Degraw to testify about the reeorded message violated the hearsay rules.
The reeorded message was an out of court statement being offered for the truth of the
matters assert. Therefore, it was not admissible in court. A statement is not hearsay if
the statement is offered against a party and is against the party's own statement. £vee
Utah R. Uvid. 801. However, Degraw could not identify who left the message. He could
not establish that the recorded message was left by Denier and it was against his interest.
The visitation order between Samuel and Denier regarding their son, Connor, was
relevant in that Denier was permitted to contact Samuel if that contact related to the
visitation of their son. If Samuel had taken Connor out of the state of Utah in violation of
that order it would make it more probable that any contact with Samuel related to their
son.
The trial court erred by denying Dcnicr's motion to dismiss the case after the City
presented its case. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Denier violated the
protective order.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING OFFICER DEGRAWS
TESTIMONY RELATING TO A RECORDED MESSAGE.
A. The testimony of Officer Degraw and Proceedings.
In this case, the City called Officer Degraw ("Degraw'') to testify. (R. 105:67.)
Degraw was the responding officer and listened to a recorded message Samuel, the
complaining witness, had saved on her voicemail. (R. 105:69.) While listening to the
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message, Degraw recorded it onto a small recorder he carried with him. He then
transcribed the message and included the transcription in his police report.
Prior to this incident, Degraw had never spoken to Denier and the caller never
identified himself. (R. 105:75.) However, Samuel told Degraw the message was from
Denier and was left earlier that day in violation a protective order. (R. 105:68.)
The defense made a Motion in Limine to exclude Degraw's testimony with regard
to the content of the recorded message left on Samuel's voicemail. (R. 105:37,38.) The
City did not introduce the actual message.
The defense first argued Degraw's testimony would be double hearsay. (R.
105:38.) The Officer never heard Denier make the statements. Rather, the statements
were left on a voicemail. (R. 105:51.) That in turn, was double hearsay, and should be
excluded. (R. 105:38.) Second, the defense argued that because the Officer lacked
firsthand knowledge as to the identity of the caller, and could only identify the caller
through information given to him by Samuel, the message was hearsay. (R. 105:38.)
The trial court ruled that Samuel and Degraw could testify about the content of the
recorded message. (R. 105:39,40.) However, if Degraw was unable to identify the caller
from firsthand knowledge, then that would be a foundational issue and the matter would
be revisited during Degraw's testimony. (R. 105:40.) The Officer could testily as to what
he heard on the message but not who left the message. (R. 105:42.)
During the trial, the City called Officer Degraw to the stand. (R. 105:67.) The
City asked if he listened to a recorded message left on Samuel's voicemail. (R.
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105:68,69.) Again, the defense objected for lack of foundation. (R. 105:69.) The trial
court overruled the objection and the Officer was allowed to testify. (R. 105:69.)
Degraw testified the male voice stated he knew the message was being recorded
and referenced other complaints that were made in the past. (R. 105:70.) However,
Degraw could not remember the specifics without referring to his report. (R. 105:70.)
While Degraw was refreshing his recollection, the defense objected, again, arguing
Degraw's testimony would be hearsay. (R. 105:70.) The trial court noted the objection
but overruled it. (R. 105:70.) Degraw went on to testify that the caller stated he knew
the conversation was being recorded and there had been many complaints filed in the last
eight or nine years. (R. 105:70.) All the complaints had been found false. (R. 105:70).
Particularly, Degraw noted the caller said "this is about our son, not about you, not about
me." (R. 105:70.)
B.

Degraw's testimony regarding the recorded message is hearsay
and should have been excluded.

Rule 801 defines hearsay as an oral or written assertion or statement, "other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). A statement is being
offered for the truth of the matter asserted when it is being offered to prove whether the
statement is in fact true and not merely to show that it was made. See State v. Sorcnscn,
617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake City vs. Alircs, 2000 UT App 244. «,| 22. 9 P.3d 769.
An out of court statement is not considered hearsay, if the statement is offered against a
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part) and is the party's own statement, an admission by part)-opponent. Utah R. livid.
802.
Hearsay is not admissible unless there is an exception or the Utah Rules of
Evidence allow it. Utah R. livid. 802. ''Hearsay statements have been generally
discredited because they . . . lack trustworthiness." State in the Interest of K.D.S., 578
P.2d9, 12 (Utah 1978).
7. The Statements were not an admissions by a party-opponent.
Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that hearsay is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing.
Utah R. livid. 801. The rule further defines statements that are not hearsay. Utah R.
Evid. 801 (d)(2). A statement that is being offered against a party and is the part) \s own
statement or was adopted by that party is not hearsay. Id.
In this case, Officer Degraw could not identify the caller and therefore could not
establish that the recorded message was made by Denier. (R. 105:75.) In turn, the
recorded message was hearsay and should have been excluded.
On December 30, 2007. the complaining witness, Samuel, called the police and
alleged that Denier had violated a protective order. (R. 105:68.)

Samuel recently

returned from a trip and made several phone calls to Denier. (R. 105:51.52.) Samuel was
upset because Denier had called several of their son's friends looking for their son. (R.
105:100.) After the calls. Samuel testified that Denier called. (R. 105:51.) Samuel
didn't answer the phone and he left a message on her voicemail. (R. 105:51.) Samuel
asserted that this message violated the protective order. (R. 105:68.)
11

Officer Degraw responded to Samuel's house. (R. 105:68.) His listened to the
message, recorded it with a handheld recorder, and then transcribed it into his police
report. He then testified, at trial, to the contents of the recorded message. (R. 105:70.)
During trial the court allowed Degraw*s testimony regarding what was said on the
recorded message but would not allow Degraw identify who left the message because
Degraw had neither spoken with Denier nor met him prior to this incident. (R. 105:41.)
Without Degraw being able to identify the caller, the statement could not be
accredited to Denier. Degraw could not identify who made the call. When Degraw
testified as to what was on the recorded message and specifically what the caller had said
this statement was hearsay. It was an out of court statement that was being offered into
evidence. Had Degraw been able to identify who the caller was either from prior
experience with Denier or the caller identified himself, then the statement would fall
under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) and would not be hearsay.
However, because the recorded message was hearsay, the trial court erred in allowing
Degraw to testify about the contents of the message. Certainly. Degraw could have
testified that he responded to a report of a violation of a protective order and the
complaining witness had a recorded message and that he listened to the message. He
should not have testified about the content of the message. His testimony should have
been excluded pursuant to Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
2. Degraw's testimony regarding the recorded message was being
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Denier was charged with violation of a protective. The protective order limited
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contact between the complaining witness, Samuel, and the defendant, Denier. (R.
105:55,56.) Denier could only contact Samuel to effectuate visitation between him and
his son. (R. 105:55,56.) When statements are made not to prove the truth of the
statement but to prove the statement was made, it is not being offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. Mires, 2000 UT App 244 ]\ 22.
In Alires, the defendant was convicted of telephone harassment. Id. at T] 1. The
defendant called the complaining witness on the phone and threatened to kill her. Id. at ^
3. While an officer was at the complaining witness* home, the phone rang. \d. at_/|] 4.
The caller again threatened to kill the witness. Id. During trial the complaining witness
did not testify. However, the Officer took the stand and testified as to the statements she
heard. Id. at ^[5. The defense objected to the testimony. Id. at *|j 9. The trial court
allowed the testimony. Id.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the testimony was not hearsay
because the statements were not being offered to prove that the defendant would actually
kill the complaining witness. Id, at *j[ 29. Rather, they were being offered to prove that
the statements were made. Id.
The City's evidence in favor of a protective order violation was that Denier called
and left a message on Samuel's voicemail and this violated the protective order. Denier
could not recall if he left a message, however, he did recall that around the date of the
violation he had tried to contact his son directly. (R. 105:98.) However, his son was not
answering his phone. (R. 105:98.) In an effort to locate his son he contacted the father of
his son's friend. (R. 105:98.) It was during this phone conversation that Denier learned
13

that Samuel and his son where in Colorado for Christmas. (R. 105:99.) During trial, the
City noted the statement was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (R.
105:40.)
This case differs from the A1 ires case because the protective order allowed for
some contact. In the A1 ires case, the City had to prove the statements were made. The
threatening statement served as the basis for the charged offense. In this case, Denier
was subject to a protective order. The protective order permitted Denier to contact
Samuel under certain circumstances. The contact itself did not serve as the basis for the
charged offense. A statement alone would not be a violation. Rather, it must be
determined that the contact was not related to visitation of their child. Connor.
Therefore, the content of the recorded message was being offered for the truth of the
matter asserted and is therefore hearsay.
II.

THE VISITATION ORDER WAS RELEVANT.

Utah Rule of] Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution
of the state of Utah or the Utah Rules of Evidence. Any evidence that is not relevant is
not admissible. Utah R. Rvid. 402. Relevant evidence means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R.
livid. 401. 'The standard for determining the relevance of evidence is exceedingly low."
State ex rel. G.C, 2008 U f App 270.1] 11, 191 P.3d 55. "|E"|vcn if [relevant] evidence
has the potential for prejudicing a defendant in a criminal case, it will be admitted if it has
14

unusual probative value." State vs. Downs. 2008 UT App 247, U 7, 190 P.3d 17
(citations omitted).
In Downs, the defendant denied any knowledge of possession of a controlled
substance found in her pocket. The state sought to introduce testimony that her residence
had been searched and drugs were found there on a previous occasion. This Court held
the evidence helped to establish that the defendant had ready access to. was
knowledgeable about, and had the requisite intent to posses the controlled substance and
allowed the evidence.
In this case, the protective order prohibited any contact unless it related to their
son. Like Downs, Samuel testified that the contact between the two was not related to
visitation of their son. However, on direct examination, Denier testified that there was a
visitation order in place. When asked about the content of the visitation order and
whether Denier was entitled to see him during the holidays, the City objected. (R.
105:102.) The trial court sustained the objection holding the visitation order was not
relevant to the case. (R. 105:102.) The defense argued it was relevant if Denier should
have had custody during the time Samuel to their son to Colorado. (R. 105:102.) If he
should have had custody, it would make it more probable that any contact between the
parties was related to visitation. The court erred by sustaining the City's objection and
preventing Denier from testifying about the content of the visitation order.
ni

-

TAKEN ALONE OR TOGETHER THE ERRORS DETAILED
ABOVE PREJUDICED DENIER.

Determining the harm caused by the errors detailed above requires that they be
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considered in the context of the evidence and arguments al trial. State vs. Larscn, 2005
UT App 201. *| 6, 113 P.3d 998. Harm sufficient to require reversal occurs unless 'it is
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of proceedings." State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, f|| 28,
153 P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, If 10 n.l, 994 P.2d 1237) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The errors here undermine confidence that the defendant
received a fair trial.
The error in allowing Dcgraw to testify about the contents of the voiccmail was
prejudicial. The City prosecuted Denier for Violation of Protective Order Class A
Misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. 76-5-108. For the offense, the City was required to prove
that the Denier was the subject to a protective order, he intentionally or knowingly
violated that order after having been properly served. This case is unique in that contact
would not have been sufficient to establish a violation. Rather, the protective order
permitted certain contact. Denier could contact Samuel if it was related to the visitation
of their son, Connor.
In this case, the City presented evidence that Samuel spent Christmas with their
son Connor, in Colorado. Denier had called several of Connor's friends in an attempt to
locate his son. (R. 105:49.) Upon returning home, Samuel called Denier upset because
Denier was trying to contact their son. (R. 105:100.) The City was unable to introduce
the original recording but Samuel summarized what the message said. (R. 105:54.)
The only evidence of the violation was officer Dcgraw \s testimony. Dcgraw's
testimony was crucial to the City's case. The prosecutor relied on his testimony to urge
16

jurors to convict. The jury was instructed that they arc the sole judges of the weight of
the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the facts. (R. 105:113-115.) Further,
there is no firm rule for determining the truthfulness and credibility of the witnesses and
that the jury was to use their own judgment. (R. 105:115.) The jury was also instructed
that they could judge the witnesses. (R. 105:114.) They could consider the witnesses*
motive for testifying and the interest the witness may have in the outcome of the case and
how such an interest may have affected or colored their testimony. (R. 105:114.)
The only witness the City presented to the jury that could have been construed as
neutral would have been Dcgraw's testimony. He had not met the parties before this
incident and was the first one to respond to the scene. His testimony would have been
crucial to the jury's determination. Dcgraw's testimony significantly contributed to the
Denier's conviction.
Because the trial court allowed Dcgraw to testify about the contents of the
recorded message, Denier is entitled to a new trial where the City must be precluded from
presenting the inadmissible hearsay.
Second, precluding Denier from discussing the visitation order was prejudicial. At
issue in the case, and for the City to prove a violation, was dependant on whether the
contact related to the visitation of the parties' son. The protective order prohibited
contact except to effectuate visitation of their son. Denier testified that he was trying to
contact his son during the holiday. Had evidence been introduced that Denier had legal
custody of Connor during the time in question it is more probable that the jury would
have considered his contact with Samuel lawful.
17

Combined with Dcgraw's testimony regarding the content of the message and the
preclusion of the defense discussion of visitation order. Denier was prejudiced and is
entitled to a new trial.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DENIER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AFTER THE STATE PRESENTED ITS
CASE.

The evidence at trial was insufficient to support the conviction for a violation of a
protective order. Utah Rule or Criminal Procedure 17(p) provides that at the conclusion
of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the c\ idence. the court may
issue an order dismissing any information or indictment upon the ground that the
evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged. Utah R. of Crim. P.
17(p). To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd. 2001 UT 30, ^|
13. 25 P.3d 985 (citations omitted).
In the event the evidence presented at trial is contradictory or conflicting, so long as a
reasonable interpretation, that evidence supports each clement of the offense, this Court
will not disturb the jury's verdict. Sec Boyd.
fW|c do not sit as a second trier of fact: "It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses/ So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops/*
Id. at «| 16 (citations omitted). See also State v. Cravens, 2000 UT Ct. App 344, 15 P.3d
635; State v. Chancy, 1999 UT App 309. 989 P.2d 1091.
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In addition, a conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence. "Circumstantial
evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as
to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to
sustain a conviction." State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998) (citation
omitted). "|T]hc inferences that can be drawn from th|e] evidence [must] have a basis in
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337. 344 (Utah 1997)
(citation omitted).
Nevertheless, "w[a| guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id. (citation
omitted). The function of a reviewing court is to ensure "that there is sufficient
competent evidence as to each clement of a charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Mcrila, 966 P.2d
270, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). As set forth below, the inconclusive
evidence here gave rise only to speculative possibilities, warranting dismissal of the
charge.
The marshaled evidence is as follows: Denier was the subject of a protective
order. The protective order had been in place for ten years and prohibited Denier from
contacting Samuel except regarding visitation of their son. Connor. (R. 105:55.56.) At the
close of the City's case, the defense moved the trial court to dismiss for insufficient
evidence. (R. 105:86.)
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On December 30, 2007, Samuel returned home from a trip to Colorado. (R. 105:49.)
While she was out of town with Connor, Denier called several acquaintances and asked if
they knew where their son, Connor, was. (R. 105:49.) Denier was entitled to see his son
every Wednesday and every other weekend. Denier was unable to contact his son during
the holidays and became concerned. (R. 105:99.)
Samuel testified that while on the trip she received a phone call from the father of one
of Connor's friends. (R. 105:49.) She told her that Denier called looking for Connor.
(R. 105:49.) This upset Samuel. (R. 105:100.) When she returned home, she called
Denier advising him not to call any of their friends looking for Connor. (R. 105:100.)
After the call ended, Samuel called Denier again. (R. 105:100.) After the second calf
Denier called Samuel and left a message. (R. 105:51.) He discussed the protective order
and stated that this conversation was about their son Connor. (R. 105:54.) Further, he
stated they have been to court numerous times about the protective and he has never
convicted. (R. 105:54.)
The evidence in this case compels the determination that the conversation between
Samuel and Denier related to their son and Denier's visitation rights and therefore was
not a violation of the protective order. Samuel was upset because Denier had been trying
to locate his son. When she returned home, she called him two times advising him not to
call acquaintances looking for his son. When Denier returned her call he specifically
noted that this was not about Samuel nor him but was in fact about their son, which
would not be a violation of the protective order.
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CONCLUSION
Denier respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.
RliSPKCTRJLLY SUBMITTED this 7S\ day of July, 2009.

c

CHARITY l&ti
SH-REV1
Attorney for Dcfendant/Appel
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Defendant's Attorney(B): LORENZO, ELIZABETH A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 12, 1958
Video
Tape Number:
TAPE
Tape Count: 2:56
CHARGES
1. VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/01/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE
ORDER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 365 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail. The total time
suspended for this charge is 361 day(s).

Case No: 081900493
Date:
Nov 25, 2008
COMMUNITY SERVICE
Complete 40 hour(s) of community service,
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 year(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by S.L. County Criminal Justice.
Defendant to serve 4 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.
Defendant is to report by December 1/ 2 008.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no laws.
SERVE 4 DAYS JAIL - REPORT 12/1/08
WORK 4 0 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE
NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM MS SAMUEL
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

K.jCfhrhft ^' $frud4 .
PROTECTTVE ORDER
Petitioner,

J>W P. Deri?,

Judge (jjtttf*^ 7 V " ^

Respondent.
0*Hr-x.

This matter came for hearing on / £ / z ? / 3 p /
following parties were in attendance:
#

j E ^ ^ J T (^0~<zJL**r

, before the undersigned. The

'

Petitioner

^

Petitioner's attorney hr*nk

Respondent

a

Respondent's attorney

D>My(4r

S^/AS\>4WL/^

The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and:
A having received argument and evidence,
having accepted the stipulation of the parties
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred,

^v y
A

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial
each section that is included in this Order.)
1.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to
commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner.

2.

The Respond., is r e i n e d from a^mpting
«
*
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor cnu
of Petitioner's family or household:

^ 5 T
• ^

3

.

^

S

The Respondent is prohibited from directlyor . i ^ ™ 9 f * £ & % telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Penttoner, vc<rt A * K « * « *
r ^ R e i n d l " ^ be removed and eluded, and shall stay away, from
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at.

J ? £ ^ A & t o l from t e S d n l ^ r f e r i n g with the uoUry services ,o
^ K > c residence.
' " V
5
The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school place of " J j * * ^
-£L / o r oAer p . a £ . and their premises, frequented < » £ ^ * X S £ * * e
the designated household and family members. These places are mennnea y
following addresses:
,
I /yf.1]

using, or possessing a^firarm and/or the following weapon(s):
7.

m e Petitioner is awarded possession of the foUowing residence, automobile

and/or other essential personal effects:

This award is subject to orders concerning the Usted property in future domestic
proceedings.

g/16/96
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8.

An officer fsom the following law enforcement agency:
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner
safely regains possession of the awarded property.
9.
An officer Ifcom the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's
removal of Respondeht's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The
law enforcement officer$hall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items.
10.
The Respondeat is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this
Order, ihe Department of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on
Respondent and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in
the residence of Respondentv Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of
Corrections the costs of the\lectronic monitoring required by this Order. The
Department of Corrections shan\have access to Petitioner's residence to install the
appropriate monitoring equipment.

RESPONDEiNT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" THROUGH "10* MAY BE A
CLASS A MISDEMEANOR.

Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through T ) which will
(expire/be revieWd by the court)
days from the date of this order:
a.

The Petitioner is granted custody of the following minor children:

Visitation shall be as follows:

V
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c.

Tne Respondent

is

restrained from using drugs ana/or alcohol prior to or during

visitation.
d.

The Responded is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ren from the

state of Utah.
e.
of $

The Respondent ^ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount
The Respondent is^or ^ J ^ ^ U [ a h U n i f o r m C h i l d Sup port Guidelines.

f
The Respondent is \dered to participate in mandatory income withholding
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5.
g.

The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care

expenses.

\

The Respondent is o r d e r e A pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical
expenses including premiums, deductions and co-payments.
h

i.

The Respondent is ordered to paVPetitioner spousal support in the amount of

j.

The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a

result of the abuse in the amount of S

\

.

k.
The Respondent is ordered to pay the Vinor child/ren's medical expenses,
suffered as a result of the abuse in the amount of *
I.

Other

ion of provisions V
Violation
11.

t h r o n g -1- may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings.

The Division of Child and family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation

Into the allegation of child abuse.

yC

12.

Other:

'"~^Xi/o CCA^J^ c&r^^Ujl
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13.
Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have
authority to compel Respondents compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected arras.
14.
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing
that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103322, 108 Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in ail the United States, the District
of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories.
15.
Three yean after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made
available to Respondent.
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BY THE CO

DISTRICT CO
Recommended by:

District Court Commissioner

Date

By this signarureJRespondent approves the form, and accepts service,
of this ProjectiveOrder and waives the right to be personally served.

R^p^erft*^'*^
Serve Respondent at:

3&°l 5- /OOP £

&3-

2?2i,H„l H ' S IS A TRUE COPv OF
STATE

WM

DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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